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ABSTRACT
The understanding of co-production as a concept is fragmented; there are many different
definitions and many cases are labeled co-production. Two dimensions seem to be important in
most definitions: the ability of the co-producer to self-produce or to produce the same product
without input from others and the extent to which co-producers’ participation is voluntary. Based
on these dimensions, this article develops a typology of co-production. It is shown that cases in
which involuntariness is combined with a high ability of self-production are rare. This article







From roughly the late 1970s, the idea of community
members and public professionals collaborating to pro-
duce public services gained foothold (cf., Brudney &
England, 1983; Ostrom, 1976, 1996; Parks et al., 1981).
Over time, this idea became known as “co-production”
and has since been studied extensively. Despite the
wealth of research, scholars have yet to agree on a
definition of co-production, which has resulted in a
wide variety of cases studied under this heading. For
example, cases of co-production include parental invol-
vement in childcare services (Pestoff, 2008); volunteers
generating small, highly tailored community-based care
packages for vulnerable elderly people (Jackson, 2013);
citizens participating in neighborhood watches (Van Eijk
& Steen, 2013); and taxpayers providing information and
calculating tax liabilities (Alford, 2009). These examples
illustrate the wide range of tasks and relations of the
actors involved in what are considered co-production
processes. In these and other cases, the only common
denominator seems to be the presence of a community
member and a professional. This variety leads us to ask
what exactly makes co-production “co-production”?
The wide variety of definitions developed for the term
has profound consequences for research in the field of co-
production, especially in terms of the comparability of
research findings. Although many studies have been car-
ried out and important progress has been made, results are
rarely compared (Brandsen & Honingh, 2014). As a con-
sequence, several important and relevant questions remain
unanswered, including what the special benefits of co-
production processes are (Verschuere, Brandsen, &
Pestoff, 2012, p. 19). Comparisons among different forms
of co-production could help to increase our insights into
these benefits.
In an attempt to overcome conceptual confusion, scho-
lars like Brandsen and Honingh (2014) try to theoretically
identify the core variables defining the concept of co-
production. In contrast, this article takes an approach
that is more concerned with the practical applicability of
the concept. A typology of co-production is constructed
using widely accepted definitions and case examples.
Based on a review of the literature, it is shown that cases
can differ along two dimensions: the ability to produce the
same product without co-production and the voluntari-
ness of participation in co-production processes. These
dimensions create a 2×2 typology of co-production.
One cell in the typology—where the co-producer has the
ability to self-produce and co-production is involuntary—
cannot be easily explored, as there are few exemplary cases
in the extant literature. To contribute to our understanding
of this kind of co-production, this article analyses the nature
of the interactions and outputs in a case that meets the
requirements for this cell, namely Dutch food safety ser-
vices. The research question is: What does the interaction
and output look like when the public service delivery process
is characterized by involuntary participation of the co-pro-
ducer and a large ability of the co-producer to self-produce?
This article starts with a literature review that aims to build
a typology of co-production. It then presents the case,
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methodological approach, and data, followed by a
discussion.
Co-production: A brief literature review of an
umbrella concept
This section elaborates on and compares different defi-
nitions used within the literature. Thereafter, a typology
is developed based on theoretical considerations and
discussed using exemplary co-production cases.
Development of the concept’s content
Within academia, the term “co-production” first arose
in the 1980s within a more economic-oriented stream
of literature, which focused on how to increase the
efficiency of (local) governments and service delivery
(cf., Brudney & England, 1983; Parks et al., 1981). In
these studies, co-production is defined as “mixing . . .
the productive efforts of regular and consumer produ-
cers” (Parks et al., 1981, p. 1002). Regular producers are
those “individuals and groups in a society who produce
for exchange” (Parks et al., 1981, p. 1002). In this
definition, the exact product is not further specified.
Yet, the study offers two examples: education (the
result of collaboration between teacher and student)
and safety (the result of collaboration between police
officers and citizens). Parks and his colleagues (1981, p.
1002) note that being a regular producer is not a fixed
trait of individuals or groups in society, but that who
they are depends on the specific service under scrutiny.
In other words, people can be regular producers in one
instance but can contribute at the same time to other
goods and services as “consumer producers.”
According to this broad definition, all situations in
which consumers contribute in some way to the pro-
duction of a public service can be designated as co-
production. Whether these consumers are private
actors, individual citizens, or non-profit organizations
is not further specified.
In the 1990s, scholars like John Alford and Elinor
Ostrom gave a new impulse to the development of the
co-production concept, by emphasizing the added value
of co-producers’ input (e.g., time, efforts, labor).
According to Alford (1993, p. 140), a wide variety of
actors, other than the (regular) producing unit, can be
involved in government projects, “such as the target
group being regulated, or the program’s clients, or
other public sector agencies, or citizens generally.”
Using the capabilities of these co-producing actors,
governments will be able to accomplish their objectives.
Likewise, Ostrom (1996, p. 1073) puts emphasis on the
value of co-producers’ input for the production of
goods and services, defining co-production as “the pro-
cess through which inputs used to produce a good or
service are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’
the same organization.”
In contrast to Alford’s (1993) definition, Ostrom
(1996) seems to limit the kind of actors that can be
considered co-producers to citizens, excluding, for
example, third-sector organizations.1 Pestoff (2012)
underlines this restriction, by separating co-production
from co-management and co-governance. In Pestoff’s
definition, co-production is about the collaboration
between citizens and (semi-)public organizations,
whereas co-management and co-governance are about
the collaboration between third-sector organizations,
public agencies, and for-profit actors. Although the
processes of co-management and co-governance both
include the same kind of actors, their differences lie in
the activities carried out. Co-management is restricted
to the delivery phase, while co-governance includes
decision-making and planning activities (Pestoff, 2012,
p. 18).
In recent research, scholars refer mainly to the defi-
nitions of co-production given by Bovaird (2007), and
Brandsen, Pestoff, and Verschuere (2012). Bovaird
(2007, p. 847) defines co-production as “the provision
of services through regular, long-term relationships
between professionalized service providers (in any sec-
tor) and service users or other members of the com-
munity, where all parties make substantial resource
contributions.” From this perspective, the crucial dif-
ference between “normal” collaboration and “full user/
professional co-production” is the dependence of pro-
fessionals on users/community members to co-deliver
and co-plan their activities, goods, or services (Bovaird,
2007, p. 848). In other words, four elements are impor-
tant in Bovaird’s definition: (1) co-producers can be
actors other than citizens as long as they (2) contribute
resources, and (3) have a long-term relationship with
professionals that is (4) characterized by interaction in
both the co-planning and co-delivery phases. In con-
trast, the definition by Brandsen et al. (2012) focuses on
citizens’ contributions. This definition adds two impor-
tant elements, namely that: (1) citizens’ efforts should
be voluntary, and (2) aimed at enhancing the quality of
the services produced.
This brief review shows that perceptions of co-pro-
duction have moved from a (business) economic
approach to a more political, public administrative
one. In the earlier research, the focus was more on
the delivery process itself, that is, how to produce
public services efficiently (in terms of both quality
and quantity) and how to ensure the services were
produced at all (cf., Bovaird, Van Ryzin, Loeffler, &
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Parrado, 2015). Later on, the focus of research moved
to the actors involved in the co-production processes.
Here, the definitions began to stress the efforts pro-
vided by the different actors and the dynamics and
interactions between them.
Within both the economic and the political-admin-
istrative approaches, different definitions were devel-
oped. This divergence in definitions has resulted in a
research field that is characterized by conceptual con-
fusion. This has profound consequences, especially in
terms of the comparability of research findings. For
example, Voorberg, Bekkers, and Tummers (2014)
show in their extensive review that comparisons of
findings and cases are rare, and that attempts to com-
pare findings are hindered by the use of different defi-
nitions. Therefore, the cumulative effect of past work is
hampered, resulting in a low level of progress in the
field (Brandsen & Honingh, 2014).
Three denominators distinguished
Above, the different definitions of co-production used
over the years were briefly reviewed. A comparison of
these definitions reveals three common elements: (1)
the nature of the interaction, (2) who is involved as a
co-producer, and (3) the nature of the output. Each of
these is discussed below.
Nature of the interaction
The first element concerns the nature of the “co” in co-
production, that is, the nature of the interaction between
the regular producer and co-producer. The relationship
between the co-producer and regular producer is per-
ceived to be based on “exchange” (Ewert & Evers, 2012,
p. 61), with professionals and co-producers acting as
equal partners (Boyle & Harris, 2009), and both actors
putting efforts in and providing input for this exchange
(Loeffler & Hine-Hughes, 2013; Ostrom, 1996).
The nature of the interaction can also be described in
terms of its duration. Here, a distinction can be made
between long-term relationships (often in the form of insti-
tutionalized arrangements) (Joshi & Moore, 2004) and
more ad hoc activities (Pestoff, 2012). Examples of the latter
are citizens writing postal codes on letters and citizens
filling out their individual tax returns (Alford, 2009).
Finally, when considering the nature of the interac-
tion, it is possible to distinguish individual and collec-
tive forms of co-production. A collective nature means
that the output is collectively enjoyed, or the input is
collectively supplied, or a combination of both (Bovaird
et al., 2015). There are two types of co-production with
a collective nature. In the first type, collective co-pro-
duction, the benefits of the output are shared by the
entire community. In the second type, group co-produc-
tion, only a specific group enjoys the benefits from the
co-production process (e.g., clients/users) (Bovaird
et al., 2015; Brudney & England, 1983).
Both collective and group co-production can be dis-
tinguished from individual co-production processes, in
which “single” co-producers collaborate with regular
producers. Usually, this involves ad hoc activities
(Pestoff, 2012). An example can be found in informal
caregivers. Here, the input is individually provided (by
the informal caregiver), and the output is individually
enjoyed (by the relative receiving the benefits of the
direct care provided).
Who is involved as co-producer
Within the different definitions and studies, several
actors can be distinguished as potential co-producers.
Citizens and clients (also labeled as consumers or users)
are often mentioned, as well as volunteers, members of
the community, and the general public. The question
who is involved as a co-producer directly links with the
above-mentioned differences concerning who benefits
from the services delivered. When clients are involved,
this inherently implies that the co-producers are also
the direct beneficiaries of the services/goods produced.
In contrast, when citizens or the general public are
involved as co-producer, the co-producers not necessa-
rily are the direct beneficiaries of the services/goods.
The critical reader would notice that none of these
different co-producers are business entities; rather, they
are non-profit actors. Within the literature, debate
exists around the question whether for-profit or semi-
profit organizations can also be involved as co-produ-
cers. For example, Pestoff (2009) analyzed a case in
which third-sector organizations were involved as co-
producers. Yet, in 2012 he argued that processes in
which third-sector organizations are involved cannot
be considered “co-production” but instead should be
labeled co-management or co-governance. More
broadly, the literature appears to be ambivalent with
regard to accepting processes involving private actors as
co-production. Several cases in the literature include
private actors (e.g., Baars, 2011; Tuurnas, Stenvall,
Rannisto, Harisalo, & Hakari, 2014) and others exclude
private actors (Meijer, 2014; Van Eijk & Steen, 2015a)
(for an overview of cases, see Voorberg et al., 2014).
Nature of the output
The third element that can be distinguished within the
literature is the nature of the process’ output. Co-pro-
duction processes result in more or less concrete out-
puts (i.e., public services /goods); examples are safe
neighborhoods, activities organized at primary schools,
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and letters with postal codes. Co-production is assumed
to have several benefits, such as ensuring the outputs
are produced at all, increasing the quantity, or improv-
ing both quality and efficiency (cf., Bovaird et al., 2015).
In other words, co-production is an instrument “to
produce better outcomes in terms of service quality
and efficiency” (Ewert & Evers, 2012, p. 61).
The output can be beneficial to different actors at once.
Often, the direct consumers benefit most; however,
through “value chains” value is also added for other
citizens and actors (Bovaird & Loeffler, 2012, pp.
40–42). Take for example, citizens filling out their tax
forms (Alford, 2009); this is not only in their own interest
and for governments’ benefits, but also for society as a
whole. In this way, the value produced by co-production
activities expands beyond direct users’ desires and needs
and contributes to satisfaction of wider groups and society
as a whole. This expansion of value especially holds true
for private actors involved in co-production processes
(e.g., firms, third-sector organizations), because these
actors are confronted with (social) pressures for “corpo-
rate social responsibility.” That is, in their activities, they
are stimulated and forced to seek ways to increase the
social, environmental, and political value of the products
delivered (Bovaird & Loeffler, 2012). Yet, this raises the
question how added value corresponds with the short-
term (economic) interests of the actors involved.
In sum, based on a brief review of definitions, three
elements are found to be important in analyzing cases
of co-production: (1) the nature of the interaction, (2)
who is involved as a co-producer, and (3) the nature of
the output. However, although these three elements are
useful for structuring the description of cases (i.e., to
ensure all relevant aspects and characteristics of the
cases are discussed) (see Table 1), they are less useful
for distinguishing among cases. Each denominator
includes a number of characteristics on which cases
can differ. For example, the nature of the interaction
is about the equality of the actors involved, the duration
of their collaboration, and the collective/individual nat-
ure. Moreover, and more important in this respect, the
content of the three elements overlap; for example, who
is a co-producer also links with the collective or indi-
vidual nature of the interaction. In other words, the
three elements are not mutually exclusive and therefore
do not serve the purpose of categorization among co-
production activities. For that, we need a typology with
more concrete dimensions on which cases can have a
mutually exclusive score (i.e., being more or less pre-
sent/visible). Given the wide variety of cases studied
within the literature, it would be interesting to include
in the typology not only the theoretical insights pro-
vided by the definitions, but also the characteristics of
cases studied. Such an “empirically supported” typology
would be of added value to the current literature, as the
combination between theoretical and empirical insights
has the potential to increase the practical applicability
of the typology. Within the next section, such a typol-
ogy is presented.
Distinguishing cases
An analysis of the elements discussed above and pre-
sented in Table 1 exposes two underlying dimensions
on which the three elements are connected: (1) the
ability to self-produce the product or service and (2)
the voluntariness of participation. The dimension
regarding the ability to self-produce is concerned with
who the co-producer is (e.g., client, general public, for-
profit entity) and what output is produced. This dimen-
sion considers the extent to which the co-producer is
able to produce the same output without the input of
regular producers (e.g., governmental agencies). In
other words, it discusses the extent to which interaction
between actors is required to produce the good or
service delivered. The second dimension, the voluntari-
ness of participation, focuses on the (institutional) set-
ting in which co-producers interact with regular
producers. Co-production processes can be institution-
ally embedded and command co-producers’ efforts and
engagement; for example, Joshi and Moore (2004, p.
36) talk about such institutionalized forms of co-pro-
duction and “mutual obligation.” Yet, not all co-pro-
duction processes are prescribed by law; they can be
organized in more ad hoc ways, or “spontaneously” be
organized by co-producers’ themselves. As such, these
types of activities offer more of a free choice to poten-
tial co-producers about whether to engage.
When combined, these dimensions result in a
2×2 typology categorizing co-production cases (see
Figure 1). In the following, the cells in this typology
are described in more detail, discussing some exemp-
lary cases of co-production and using sectors that are
often studied within the co-production literature,
such as health care, education, and safety. The review
by Voorberg and his colleagues (2014) shows that
most empirical data is collected in the education
and health care sectors, but attention to the safety
sector has recently increased (cf., Freise, 2012; Joshi
& Moore, 2004; Meijer, 2014; Percy, 1978). The cells
Table 1. Common elements for structuring an analysis of
co-production cases.
Nature of interaction The co-producer involved Nature of the output
Partnership Public/private Tangibility output
Duration Individual/organization Who benefits most?
Collectiveness
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in the typology are labeled with letters, because titles
might lead to a narrow interpretation of the category
instead of a broad understanding of the characteris-
tics of co-production cases in each cell.
Examining the typology, it can be observed that
within cells A and B, co-producers’ participation is
not institutionalized by law. Often, the co-production
processes in these cells are characterized by a more ad
hoc nature and are bottom-up initiated and organized.
Moreover, participation in the co-production activities
found in both cells is voluntary. The difference between
the cells is found in the co-producers’ ability to self-
produce; in cell A, there is a high ability to self-pro-
duce, but in cell B there is not.
An exemplary case for Cell A is that of parents
organizing and guiding activities at primary schools
(e.g., Christmas celebrations, school trips, school gar-
dens). These activities are referred to as “social partici-
pation” (Pestoff, 2008, p. 21). Parents volunteer to help
organize these activities. Although the schools’ input is
useful for the organization of these activities, it is not
necessary. In other words, parents are able to organize a
celebration without the schools’ (active) input.
Nevertheless, the fact that a co-producer would be
capable of producing the output himself does not
mean that the collaboration with the regular producer
is not of added value. Not only can the regular produ-
cer provide capacity (time, money, and knowledge), but
his involvement can also help “legitimize” the activity.
Within the co-production processes represented in
cell B, the ability to self-produce is much smaller.
Exemplary cases include neighborhood watches.
Research shows that—although municipalities can facil-
itate and stimulate neighborhood watch by offering the
required resources (e.g., training and materials) (cf.,
Van der Land, 2014)—citizens organize themselves
into teams to patrol streets, de-escalate troubles with
youth loitering, and report malfunctioning streetlamps,
for example. However, although these activities appear
to be carried out by the citizens themselves, pure self-
production in the case of neighborhood watches is not
possible for several reasons. Being part of the
neighborhood watch team brings the members of
these teams into situations that could turn violent,
without being able to sufficiently protect themselves.
These teams do not have the authority to make arrests,
and as such the teams are not able to eliminate the
threat. Therefore, backup by the police is always
needed. Without this backup system, citizens are less
willing to participate in neighborhood watch teams
(Van Eijk & Steen, 2015a). To phrase it differently,
the neighborhood watch teams are not able to produce
the final “product” of safety on their own; they need the
collaboration of police agents as “regular producers.”
In contrast to cells A and B, participation in the co-
production activities found in the bottom cells of the
typology (cells C and D) is non-voluntary as it is
required by law. Cell D contains the co-production
processes in which this involuntariness is combined
with a low and in some cases non-existent ability of
self-production. An exemplary case can be found in the
health care sector. In several countries, patients are
given a voice in the planning, delivery, and evaluation
of health care services, although the exact shape of this
input can differ. In The Netherlands, each health care
organization is obliged by law to install a client council
to discuss all relevant issues (Rijksoverheid, 2011). In
this case, the council members are dependent on the
health care organization, since they as co-producers
cannot produce the same output (i.e., health care of a
good quality) without input from the professionals.
Similarly, the health care organization is dependent
on the co-producers, not only to comply with the law,
but also because the collaboration with the client coun-
cil is part of the performance indicators established by
the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate. The dependence
on the co-producers becomes even clearer when one
realizes that the council has the legal right of approval
on some of the policy issues, meaning that some of the
policy initiatives cannot be implemented without the
council’s approval.
Finally, cell C captures cases of co-production in
which the involuntariness of co-producers’ participa-
tion is combined with a large ability to self-produce.
Dimensions
Ability to Self-Produce 





Example: parents involved in 








Example: client councils in 
health care organizations
Figure 1. A typology of co-production.
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While this cell logically results from the two dimen-
sions in the typology of co-production, the current co-
production literature does not, to our knowledge, con-
tain cases that fit into this cell.
To contribute to our understanding of this type of
co-production, this article presents and discusses the
case of the Dutch food safety services in regard to
slaughterhouses. This case fits within the characteristics
captured by cell C: involuntariness and the ability to
self-produce. On the one hand, slaughterhouses are
perfectly capable of producing a tangible meat product,
but on the other hand, the law requires Dutch food
safety services to clear the tangible meat products as
safe for consumption before these products are allowed
in the food chain. The added value of the co-produc-
tion process can be found in the (lack of) self-regulat-
ing capacity of the sector; due to economic interests,
complete self-regulation is not an option. Before dis-
cussing the nature of the interaction and output, and
who is involved as a co-producer, the next sections
provide the case background and research methods.
Dutch food safety services
Traditionally, an important task assigned to govern-
ments is to reduce risks for society in different fields
of daily life. One of the inspection services from which
Dutch citizens benefit on a daily basis is the Dutch food
safety services. The Netherlands Food and Consumer
Product Safety Authority2 (NVWA) is charged with,
among other things, safeguarding the values of public
health, animal health, and animal welfare (NVWA,
2014). In this article, the focus is on the NVWA
Department of Veterinary & Import, which is charged
with monitoring the food production chain where live
animals are involved. The Dutch food safety services
employs around 400 veterinarians, both on a contract
basis and as civil servants, which makes it the largest
employer of veterinarians in The Netherlands.
In recent years, perceptions about how inspections
should function have changed. In 2006, the Dutch
government launched a campaign—entitled “Renewed
Surveillance”3—to reduce the “inspection burden” for
businesses and to make inspection services more effi-
cient and effective (Inspectieloket, 2014). As stated in
the policy document, the program’s underlying starting
point is that there is “trust in businesses, unless. . .,”
which actually means that fewer inspections are per-
formed in companies that have “proven” themselves to
work according the rules. This resulted in a new type of
inspections—risk-based inspections—that are only per-
formed when risks are identified. This new type of
inspection has altered the relationship between
inspector and inspectee. Risk-based inspections are
usually combined with system-based inspections,
based on the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Points system of inspectees (Inspectieloket, 2012).
These developments also have influenced the inspec-
tion approach of the NVWA. This approach has not
only become more risk-based, but also more dependent
on the knowledge and cooperation of the meat industry
(NVWA, 2014). The main assumption behind this
approach is that businesses adhere to rules and regula-
tion and are capable of organizing their own inspection
processes. However, a recent report of the Dutch safety
board4 (OvV, 2014) put this philosophy to test when it
concludes that the self-rectifying behavior of the sector
is unsatisfactory. The board asserts that the withdrawal
of food inspection was premature, as food safety was
not safeguarded (OvV, 2014). The report shows an
inspection service where inspections not only have
been reduced but also have become more systematic
and routine. This has led to goal displacement, in which
inspection has become a goal in itself. In addition, the
sector deals with small profit margins, making the will-
ingness from companies to self-rectify low. According
to the Dutch safety board, this has created a situation in
which meat safety is under pressure.
The board recommends the improvement of co-pro-
duction in the sector as one of the main solutions to
improve meat safety. It emphasizes the need for “public
and private parties in the meat production chain to
interpret their responsibilities appropriately. They
both need to feel more responsible for their common
goal: safe meat for the public” (OvV, 2014, p. 6;
authors’ translation). As the recommendations of the
reports revolve around increased exchange of informa-
tion and correction of each other’s behavior, the con-
clusion appears to be that the co-production between
public and private parties in the meat industry needs to
improve (OvV, 2014).
Research methods
To examine the case of Dutch food safety services,
the elements derived from the different definitions of
co-production are used to analyze this particular co-
production process, namely: (1) the nature of the
interaction, (2) who is involved as a co-producer,
and (3) the nature of the output. To analyze the co-
production process, archival documents were used
along with 38 semi-structured interviews with veter-
inary inspectors. The respondents were selected based
on gender, age, tenure, and employment contract to
maximize variation in the sample (a strategy referred
to as purposive sampling (Weiss, 1994)). Within the
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interviews, the focus was on the different perceptions,
motivations, and behaviors of veterinary inspectors
regarding their work.5
The introduction of risk-based inspection has
increased the influence of slaughterhouses in the
inspection process. From the inspectors’ perspective,
this fact combined with the hierarchical nature of the
co-production process elevates the importance of deter-
mining how to handle this change. As research on how
changes in the co-production process affect profes-
sionals is still in its infancy (cf., Van Eijk & Steen,
2015b), this article specifically focuses on the co-pro-
duction process from the perspective of the regular
producer (i.e., the inspector).
Since the article aims to better understand a kind of
co-production that is rarely studied within the co-pro-
duction literature, the use of deductive, a priori
assumptions needed to be avoided. In other words,
the concepts and their relationship are based as much
as possible on the empirical data; a method that fits
with a grounded theory approach (see for example
Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The coding process of the
qualitative data collected is pivotal for securing scien-
tific rigor in qualitative research (Boeije, 2010).
Therefore, considerable attention was paid to the cod-
ing of the interviews using the software-program
MAXQDA. To establish inter-rater reliability, the cod-
ing of the different interviews was discussed among the
researchers. Where differences in interpretation existed,
a shared interpretation was established.
The coding of the empirical data started from three
different questions based on the common elements in
co-production (Table 1), including: (1) what is the out-
put of the co-production process in Dutch food safety
services?, (2) who in this process is the co-producer and
who the professional?, and (3) what is the nature of the
interaction between inspectors and inspectees in this
case? In the following sections, the findings of this
study are presented. The quotes used to support the
analysis are reported by interview number and trans-
lated from Dutch.
Co-production and the NVWA: Output, actors,
and interaction
This section analyzes the case of Dutch food safety
services, using the three elements of output, actors,
and interaction. Each element is discussed individually.
Output
To determine the output of the co-production process,
it is important to make an analytical distinction
between two processes. First, there is the “normal”
slaughtering process, resulting in a tangible meat pro-
duct. Yet, this product in itself is not sellable, as it is not
legally allowed in the food chain. This is where the co-
production process comes in. The tangible meat pro-
duct only results in a “public output” of meat that is
allowed in the food chain and safe for citizens to con-
sume after the co-production process takes place.
Interestingly, this identifies two direct consumers of
the co-production process: the companies that are
allowed to sell their meat and the consumers that can
eat meat without health risks. In fact, the benefits of
sellable and safe meat even go beyond the direct inter-
ests of both consumers, as the selling of safe meat also
stimulates the economy.
Regular producer versus co-producer
Because of the above-mentioned difference between the
slaughtering and co-production processes, it feels coun-
terintuitive to address inspectors as regular producers,
because they are not in charge of the main production
process of the good (i.e., meat). To be more precise, the
label of “regular producer” reflects the development of
“traditional public service delivery processes” toward
“co-production processes.” That is, the actor previously
responsible for the entire delivery process (including
planning and implementation) is now perceived as the
regular producer who collaborates with other actors
(i.e., the co-producers). To give an example, before
clients got involved in the health care process through
client councils, it was the management who took all the
decisions on its own. Similarly, police have always been
the main producer of safety, but are now using co-
production (i.e., neighborhood watches) to increase
effectiveness. The main point here is that the regular
producer is considered the professional, being pre-
viously solely in charge of the delivery process.
Coming back to the case of Dutch food safety ser-
vices, conflicting signals can be identified regarding the
identification of regular producer and co-producer.
First, inspectors’ knowledge about meat production is
limited. As interviewee 13 notes:
the veterinarian that starts working now, does not learn
anything about it [practicalities of the meat produc-
tion]. That makes it more difficult, because, then it
could be that you just overlook it. Then you can have
a lot of theoretical knowledge, but if you do not recog-
nize it that is the end.
Second, inspectors also depend on slaughterhouse
employees for practical support. For example, because
there are large numbers of animals, some animals are
1050 D. VAN KLEEF AND C. VAN EIJK
“missed” during inspections. In these situations, inspec-
tors rely on employees to bring these animals back for
further inspection. Interviewee 8 explains:
In other words, there is a constant stream [of animals]
and then you need, with those 2, 3, 4 men in good
collaboration, to run things smoothly and that you
agree with each other.
From this perspective, it is the slaughterhouse who
has the professional background.
However, the professionality of this knowledge
relates to the slaughtering process itself. The co-pro-
duction process is about more than just the production
of tangible meat products; it is also about clearing the
product as safe (see also Section 5.1). In this process,
the roles are reversed as inspectees are dependent on
inspectors to clear the animals as safe based on their
professional knowledge of veterinary medicine. In other
words, only inspectors can determine whether the ani-
mals are safe for consumption, meaning inspectors are
in charge of the co-production process of food safety.
Therefore, the conclusion is that inspectors are the
regular producers of the public output of safe meat.
Interactions
Finally, the nature of the interactions between the com-
panies and inspectors is intense and characterized by a
complex dynamic of mutual dependencies and hierarch-
ical relations. Veterinary inspectors work within different
companies within the same sector (i.e., cattle, poultry, or
pigs), which allows them to compare the different com-
panies. Large differences are perceived in the dispositions
of companies. Where some are considered cooperative,
others are infamous for trying to hinder veterinary
inspectors in their work. As interviewee 34 notes,
Some companies are sympathetic [towards inspectors]
and are willing to assist [the inspectors]; others per-
ceive the government as nuisance and cost factor. That
is more difficult.
Inspectors report that meat companies generally have
negative dispositions toward the Dutch food safety ser-
vices. The fact that companies have to pay (per 15 min-
utes) for the work of veterinary inspectors is one of the
factors fuelling this negative attitude. Another factor is
the costs involved with the rejection of animals or meat.
This issue was raised by interviewee 2, who said:
In that sense, the pressure is high, a lot is expected from
us. We are paid per 15 minutes, that’s not cheap and so
the farmers and entrepreneurs would rather see us go.
Inspectors notice that inspectees adopt strategies to
minimize the amount of time for which they have to pay,
for example, by requesting less time than needed and by
trying to convince inspectors to perform small extra inspec-
tion jobs without writing extra time. However, tensions are
most prominent when inspectors need extra time for enfor-
cement. Therefore, enforcement is considered detrimental
to a good working climate, or as one inspector (10) said,
when you enforce, your working relation is non-existent and
you cannot build any credits through the years.
The interviews also show that companies constantly
test how much elbow-room they can get. Therefore,
some inspectors compare their relationship with the
companies to a game between cat and mouse or the
relationship between a parent and a child. For example,
interviewee 26 states:
Just compare a slaughterhouse with a 4 or 5 year old
child. They try you. They don’t see the consequences.
They don’t take responsibility. They take many risks. It
is exactly a 5 year old [child].
Most inspectors perceive this “testing” as an una-
voidable part of the job, with which they have to deal
every time they go to a new company.
In this respect, the attitude of the company’s middle
management is important, as they have to rectify the
infringements observed by the inspectors. Inspectors per-
ceive them as being pivotal to a successful inspection and
a good working climate. In part, the importance of middle
management could be attributed to the low job security of
employees working in the slaughterhouses. As most
workers in the slaughterhouses are uneducated, barely
speak Dutch, have a temporary contract, and are afraid
to lose their jobs, middle management holds a power
position and is usually not contradicted. In some cases,
managers are even suspected of communicating orders
that are different from the demands posed by the inspec-
tor. For example, interviewee 8 noted:
At this company, I am the company inspector and the
company is a difficult case, so at the start I have been very
strict. And at a certain moment employees were not
allowed to speak with me anymore, because they told me
too much, and as a result I found out about things that I
should not have found out[. . .] Yes, you are really the
enemy, that is something you have to learn to deal with.
Tensions in the interaction between the inspector
and company also arise when companies are con-
fronted with differences in enforcement—such as
when some are punished for an infringement that
other companies get away with. This is the result of
rotations and irregular shifts, making contact moments
between inspectors few and far between. It is therefore
difficult to harmonize the different ways in which
veterinary inspectors work and communicate specifics
about the companies. Furthermore, the lack of
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uniformity stems from the fact that veterinary inspec-
tors have different ideas about how cases should be
handled and different attitudes toward enforcement.
This is clear in a statement by interviewee 5:
You try to be consistent. And we know that from each
other [the inspectors], that we have to be [consistent]. And
we do that, but of course from our own point of view.
As the meat production sector is small, companies
are aware of the differences between individual inspec-
tors, and they use this information to play the veter-
inary inspectors off against one another. Their strategic
behavior goes as far as farmers sending animals to
slaughterhouses where they know inspection is less
strict. Interviewee 18 remarked:
I know, for example, that certain customers don’t go to
specific slaughterhouses, because they [inspectors] are
less strict somewhere else.
The tensions mentioned above all originate from the
clash between the output aimed for by the inspection
services (“safe meat”) and the “corporate responsibility”
of the companies to increase the profit margins of their
organization.
Aggressive company attitudes toward inspectors are
another factor that disturbs the relationship between
inspectors and companies. As a result of the culture
within slaughterhouses and tensions from enforcement,
aggressive behaviors toward veterinary inspectors are
common. These behaviors range from passive–aggressive
tendencies, such as posturing or verbal aggression, to
bullying, and even actual physical assaults. Again, most
veterinary inspectors seem to accept this as part of the job.
These tensions in the interaction demand a lot of the
inspectors—they must have the capacity to cope with the
co-production process and prevent interactions from
escalating. First of all, inspectors need to be confident
that the decisions they take are correct; inspectors empha-
size it is important “to think before you speak” so as to not
say something incriminating. Of course, there are also
situations with which inspectors are not sure how to
deal; in these cases, inspectors can postpone their deci-
sions and consult colleagues. Inspectors also emphasize
the importance of information to support their decisions.
For example, in cases where legal action is taken, it is
critical that the inspectors have extensive and conclusive
empirical evidence (e.g., pictures, autopsies, bacteriologi-
cal tests). This is emphasized by interviewee 34:
First, I need to make an inventory: ‘what exactly is
going on here?’ Then I have to map everything; you
cannot enforce just like that, if you do not know [the
exact situation] . . . You need to build your argument.
Inspectors also put much emphasis on how to deal
with tense situations. Inspectors mention that in some
cases it is better to let inspectees calm down on their
own and walk away from the situation. Interviewee 3
insinuates that the inspector’s experience is decisive in
the decision how to approach a situation:
I’m quite good at getting them [inspectees] to calm
down. Eeh, I’m not going to put butter in front of a
cat. I think that I, yes I have experience enough, or
enough insight in this. ‘I should do this or this; I
shouldn’t do that. Do I have to walk away?’
When inspectors have discussions with inspectees in
tense situations, they try to play on the human need to
be heard and understood. Therefore, inspectors let
inspectees vent about issues and show their under-
standing regarding the difficulties inspectees’ experi-
ence. This does not mean that they automatically give
in to their wishes, but usually it creates a starting point
for further discussion. As interviewee 19 states:
Yes, show sympathy, let them [inspectees] talk and talk.
When it is done, you say ‘I understand your situation
and I sympathize, but we have more work to do’.
The interaction between inspector and inspectee
takes place on a daily basis, and there is a mutual
dependency. However, authority is held by the inspec-
tor. Inspectors really try to focus on their own tasks and
leave the responsibility for changes as a result of enfor-
cement up to the companies. The main challenge in
keeping the co-production process effective is to main-
tain what they call “a professional distance,” which
makes it easier to enforce rules and regulations and
not get captured by the interests of the organization.
This goes as far as not taking coffee from the coffee
machine without being offered (interviewee 1):
I always try to keep a safe distance to the company, that
they do not know too much about me. And that I do
not know too much about them. I would never take
coffee in the canteen, unless it is offered [. . .] If I have a
good relation with them, then I find it more difficult to
enforce.
Discussion
This article started with a literature review that identi-
fied three common elements in the co-production pro-
cess, providing several indicators useful for structuring
an analysis of co-production cases. Yet, these common
elements are not useful in making mutually exclusive
distinctions among co-production cases. Therefore, a
typology is developed that can be used to categorize
cases. This typology consists of two dimensions: (1) the
ability of co-producers to produce the same product
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without the input of regular producers and (2) the
voluntariness of participation in co-production pro-
cesses on the side of the co-producer.
Although the literature review revealed many cases of
co-production for three of the cells in the typology, we
did not find exemplary cases of co-production processes
where participation is involuntary and the ability to self-
produce is high. To further examine this kind of co-
production process, an exemplary case was introduced,
namely Dutch food safety services. In the article, the case
was described by its output, actors, and interactions. In
the analysis, it was noticed that certain factors are char-
acteristic of this type of co-production cases.
First, the involuntariness of the collaboration strains
the inspector–inspectee relationship. Tensions in the
collaboration are a result of the clash between the
economic interest of the inspected facilities and the
public values safeguarded by the inspections.
Therefore, actors in this co-production process are
constantly aware of its involuntary nature. A compar-
ison with another involuntary case (client councils in
cell D) suggests that these tensions are also present.
Although client councils are institutionalized to safe-
guard the quality of care, this is not the only potential
interest represented by the council’s individual mem-
bers. Research shows that there are also less altruistic
reasons to be part of client councils (Van Eijk &
Steen, 2014). Moreover, the reorganization of health
care on a free-market basis has increased the con-
straints on health care organizations. Thus, while the
client council and the health care organization may
have a similar interest (i.e., good care), cost reduction
has also become an important goal for health care
organizations, which potentially results in tensions
between these actors.
In short, tensions in the relationship between the
regular producer and the co-producer seem to be a
characteristic of cases where participation in
co-production is involuntary. The intensity of these
tensions is dependent on the conflicting nature of
the values and interests of the actors involved.
Further research will be necessary to see how the
involuntary nature of these co-production processes
impacts the interactions between the regular produ-
cer and the co-producer. More specifically, it will be
important to investigate how the coping strategies of
regular producers and co-producers differ in these
types of co-production.
Second, focusing on the dimension of the “ability
to self-produce,” the case of Dutch food safety ser-
vices shows a mutual dependency between the
inspector and the inspectee in terms of both
knowledge and practical support. Ultimately, how-
ever, the inspector adds public value to the product
by having the sole authorization and professional
knowledge to clear the meat as safe. In other
words, the co-producer has a high ability to self-
produce in terms of tangible meat products, but the
public trust induced by the inspection—an impor-
tant result of the co-production process—is not
something that the co-producer could achieve on
its own.
A comparison with a case in cell A where the
ability to self-produce is also high, for example par-
ental involvement in primary schools, shows again
that legitimizing the activities of the co-producer is
the main added value of the co-production. That is,
the schools’ involvement guarantees a certain contri-
bution to children’s development and the safety of
their participation. This legitimation takes place in
both cases, even though the cases differ with regard
to the co-producers’ freedom to “use” this legitimiz-
ing role of the regular producer. Where slaughter-
houses are required by law to enter the co-
production process in order to sell their products,
parents have the option available to organize activities
on their own without collaboration with primary
schools. Further research should focus on the extent
to which co-producers assign value to this contribu-
tion of the regular producer.
These comparisons helped to answer the article’s
main research question: What does the interaction and
output look like when the public service delivery process is
characterized by involuntary participation of the co-pro-
ducer and a large ability of the co-producer to self-pro-
duce? With regard to the interaction, the involuntary
nature of participation evokes tensions between regular
producers and co-producers. These tensions are intensi-
fied when there is a conflict of interests and values in the
co-production process. The second part of the research
question deals with the output of this specific type of co-
production processes. Even though the co-producer has
a high ability to self-produce, the collaboration with the
regular producers still results in added value, namely
legitimization of the tangible product.
Finally, a more fundamental question underlies this
research, namely: what is co-production and what is
not? By using a case in the margins of the concept, this
research hopes to encourage a scholarly debate on what
cases are still considered co-production by the scientific
community. Can all types distinguished in the typology
really be perceived co-production or not? To phrase it
differently, are cases similarly to Dutch food safety
services in or out?
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Notes
1. Third-sector organizations are organizations that are
placed “in between” the public and private sectors.
The term includes a broad range of different organiza-
tions, such as voluntary or community organizations
(e.g., charities and associations), social enterprises, and
co-operatives (National Audit Office, 2015).
2. The Dutch name of this organization is Nederlandse
Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit.
3. The Dutch name of this project is Vernieuwing
Toezicht.
4. In Dutch, this organization is called Onderzoeksraad
voor Veiligheid.
5. More details about the interviews and respondents can
be found in Schott, C. (2015). Playing a role-but which
one? How public service motivation and professionalism
affect decision-making in dilemma situations (Doctoral
dissertation). Den Haag: Universiteit Leiden., and Van
Kleef, D.D. (2016). Changing the Nature of the Beast:
How organizational socialization contributes to the
development of the organizational role identity of
Dutch veterinary inspectors (Doctoral dissertation).
Den Haag: Universiteit Leiden.
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